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ii.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure because the sentencing of Mr. Ray, on February 5, 1998, is
considered the final decision of the District Court. See also Utah Code Sec. 78-2a-3(e).
The Notice of Appeal was filed on March 5, 1998, within 30 days of the entry of
judgment. Thus, pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this
appeal is timely.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented for appeal are as follows:
I.

Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdicts of guilty.
The Appellate Court must review all evidence and inferences in light most

favorable of the verdict. Reversal is appropriate only when evidence is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained
reasonable doubt. State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Article I, Section 12, of the Constitution of Utah provides, in relevant part, that:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel... to be
confronted by the witnesses against him ... and the right to
appeal in all cases ... The accused shall not be compelled to
give evidence against himself.
Amendment Five of the Constitution of the United States provides, in relevant
part, that:
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No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.
Amendment Fourteen of the Constitution of the United States provides, in relevant
part, that:
No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of law.
Utah Code Section 76-1-501 provides, in relevant part, that:
A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be
innocent until each element of the offense charged against
him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such
proof, the defendant shall be acquitted.
Utah Code Section 58-37-8(l)(a)(i)(ii) and (iv) provides, in relevant part, that:
Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any
person to knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with
intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or
counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance or to
agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or
counterfeit substance; and
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in
conduct which results in any violation of any provision
of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c or 37d that is a
felony; and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or
more violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or
37d on separate occasions that are undertaken on concert
with five or more persons with respect to whom the
person occupies a position of organizer, supervisor, or
any other position of management.
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Utah Code Section 76-5-301 provides, in relevant part, that:
A person commits kidnapping when he intentionally or
knowingly and without authority of law and against the will
of the victim:
(a) detains or restrains another for any substantial period; or
(b) detains or restrains another in circumstances exposing
him to risk of serious bodily injury; or
(c) holds another in involuntary servitude; or
(d) detains or restrains a minor without consent of its parents
or guardian.
Utah Code Section 76-5-103 provides, in relevant part, that:
A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault
as defined in Section 76-5-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of
Subsection (l)(a), uses a dangerous weapon as defined in
Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to produce
death or serious bodily injury.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.

Mr. Ray appeals from his conviction following a Jury Trial of Possession of a
Controlled Substance With Intent to Distribute in violation of Utah Code Sec.
58-37-8-(2)(a), Kidnapping in violation of Utah Code Sec. 76-5-301 and Aggravated
Assault in violation of Utah Code Sec. 76-5-103.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.
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1.

On October 30, 1997, Mr. Ray was charged in a two-count Information

under Case No. 9717-263 with Kidnapping, a second-degree felony in violation of U.C.A.
76-5-301 and Aggravated Assault, a third-degree felony in violation of U.C.A. 76-5-103.
Norma Jean Strong was the alleged victim and both charges arose from incidents
occurring on October 29, 1997.
2.

In an Information under Case No. 9717-271 dated October 30, 1997, but

filed November 24, 1997, Mr. Ray was charged with Possession of a Controlled
Substance with Intent to Distribute, a second-degree felony in violation of U.C.A.
58-37-8-(l)(i)(ii) and (iv). The acts allegedly occurred on October 29, 1997, the same
date as the previous charges. Norma Jean Strong was the witness on these charges.
3.

On November 26, 1997, a Preliminary Hearing was held on Case No.

9717-263. Immediately afterwards, a Preliminary Hearing was held on Case No.
9717-271. Mr. Ray was bound over on both cases and the matters were set for a
consolidated jury trial on December 15, 1997.
4.

After trial the jury returned verdicts of guilty on all counts.

C.

DISPOSITION TN THE COURT BELOW.

Sentencing was on February 5, 1998. At that time the trial court ordered Mr. Ray
to be committed to the Utah State Prison for one to fifteen years on Count I and a term
not to exceed five years on Count II of Case No. 9717-263 and to serve a term of one to
fifteen years in Case No. 9717-271. The Court ordered the sentences to be served
consecutively. A Findings, Judgment and Commitment was filed that same day.
A Notice of Appeal was filed on March 5,1998.
D.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
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The complaining witness, Norma Jean Strong, testified that Mr. Ray was her
boyfriend for approximately two years (R-283). During that period they were involved in
illegal drug activities together (R-283). Ms. Strong guessed that she had a drug problem
and at least acknowledged having had one and being in counseling to get her "life
straightened out" (R-284). She did drugs with Mr. Ray on a regular basis (R-302). On
October 29, 1997, she was with Mr. Ray voluntarily and was requested by him to rent a
motel room, something they did frequently during their relationship (R-284).
Ms. Strong testified that she and Mr. Ray were fighting that day and that he was
screaming at her. She was terribly afraid (R-285). She stated he had made threats to her
because she had filed a peace bond (R-285).
Ms. Strong's children had been removed from her and placed in a foster home for
failure to protect. The failure to protect them was from Mr. Ray (R-286).
Mr. Ray owned at least two guns. Although Ms. Strong saw one on October 29,
Mr. Ray did not point it at her (R-289, R-290). Despite testimony of being afraid of
Mr. Ray over a lengthy period of time, Ms. Strong was able to leave his presence, make
a phone call to the Grand County Sheriffs Office, and return to Mr. Ray (R-291).
Ms. Strong informed Mr. Ray that she had called the police (R-292).
Ms. Strong allowed Mr. Ray into her vehicle for a return trip to Moab. Ms. Strong
subsequently dropped Mr. Ray off at the side of the road, returned to the motel for
personal property, then came back and picked up Mr. Ray again (R-293). Ms. Strong
testified she was hit and her hair was pulled on the drive to Moab (R-294). Ms. Strong
pulled over, took the keys out of the car and her purse and said she wouldn't ride with Mr.
Ray any longer (R-295).
Mr. Ray wanted her to come back to the car. After some hitting and hair pulling
during which Ms. Strong said she felt excruciating pain (R-296), Ms. Strong told Mr. Ray
he could have her car and gave him the keys. Mr. Ray took the keys, went to the car,
started it, did a U-turn, and drove the vehicle in Ms. Strong's direction at a high rate of
5

speed, stopping inches from her. Ms. Strong told Mr. Ray to take the car and go. He
refused. Mr. Ray put his arm around her neck and head, dragging and choking her. She
testified she blacked out (R-297).
Mr. Ray dragged the witness to her car, opened the back seat and put her in it
(R-298). Mr. Ray bit Ms. Strong on the nose and hit her over the head with something
causing knots all over it (R-298).
Ms. Strong was placed in the back seat of the car and Mr. Ray commenced the
drive back to Moab. During the trip he threatened to kill her many times (R-300).
Mr. Ray went to the homes of some friends. At the home of the second friend,
Ms. Strong's car keys were returned to her and she drove herself away. Approximately
two hours elapsed from the time the parties were at Blue Hill until Ms. Strong drove away
(R-301,R-302).
Mr. Ray had a habit of keeping drugs in bags and hiding them outside—never
bringing them indoors (R-304). The last time the witness saw Mr. Ray with drugs was
two or three days before in a purple Crown Royal bag that appeared to have about eight
ounces in it (R-306). Ms. Strong did not see any drugs on the 29th (R-306).
On Cross Examination, Ms. Strong testified as to her fragile emotional state, her
extensive drug use, her children being removed from her (R-31 l-R-313). She admitted to
using drugs one or two days before the 29th.
Ms. Strong testified the only reason she got a peace bond against Mr. Ray was
because Social Services told her she had to do so. Additionally the same agency required
ix to break off her relationship with Mr. Ray (R-316). The peace bond was obtained
perhaps as long as a month before October 29 (R-315).
Ms. Strong had the opportunity to have gotten away from Mr. Ray on several
occasions and in fact had told him on the 29th she was leaving the motel room to call the
police (R-318).
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Ms. Strong testified that despite having seen a gun in Mr. Ray's possession, and
despite his threats to kill her a number of times, she stopped for him when she saw him at
the side of the road (R-326). She stated he "took" the car keys (R-327).
She testified she could have gotten away "sometimes" over the previous two or
three days but didn't (R-329).
She did not see the marble bag or the other stuff in Monticello on October 29
(R-329).
She didn't see any evidence of drugs, do any drugs, see Mr. Ray do any drugs, or
see Mr. Ray take any drugs out of the vehicle and hide them on October 29 (R-330).
Ms. Strong's relationship with Mr. Ray was deteriorating and she knew the police were
looking for him on the 29th. (R-330, R-331). Mr. Ray had a sexual relationship with a
woman named Becky that Ms. Strong knew about (R-333).
The witness identified four pictures (Exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 4) of herself showing
physical injuries. Not all of the injuries were incurred on October 29 (R-343-R-345).
Mary Ann Sheldon testified she was on Blue Hill on October 29, 1997, and she
observed a man leap from a vehicle, tackle a person, got a license plate number and
description of the man. She provided that information to the police (R-348-R-352).
Eddie Guerrero, a Moab City Police Officer, testified that he was the police officer
who stopped Ms. Strong upon her entry into Moab based on reports from his dispatch
(R-354-R-356). Ms. Strong described an assault on her by Rodney Ray (R-358). She told
the officer she and Mr. Ray had drugs in Monticello (R-359).
Cindy Montague of the Moab City Police Department testified she saw Ms. Strong
on October 29, took the pictures marked Exhibits 1-4 and that they reflect how
Ms. Strong looked on that date (R-366, R-367).
Susan Nebeker testified. She is a nurse practitioner at Allen Memorial Hospital in
Moab, Utah. She treated Ms. Strong on October 29. Ms. Strong told her she had been
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threatened with knives. Ms. Nebeker observed several bruises and abrasions of varying
age (R-369-R-372).
Steve Caldwell testified that he knew both Rodney Ray and Norma Jean Strong
and that he had seen them on October 29. Ms. Strong was in the back seat of the car in a
fetal position. She stated twice, "Don't hurt me. "Don't hit me anymore" (R-375, R-376).
Ms. Strong had stolen a pistol from his home a week before the 29th (R-377).
Mr. Ray opined to Mr. Caldwell that Ms. Strong would come out of her incoherent
state in about fifteen minutes. He was right. Mr. Caldwell compared Ms. Strong to a little
kid throwing a tantrum who quits when there's no one around to watch (R-382, R-383).
He stated that he believed she was putting on an act and had seen her do lots of weird
things before (R-383-R-385).. He testified he has seen her hit herself before, including in
the fairly recent past (R-386). The self-hitting was so intense he felt it necessary to
restrain her (R-387). He testified that Ms. Strong knew she had to stay away from
Mr. Ray to get her children back, but every time he saw her she contacted Mr. Ray
(R-387).
Joe Nelson, Mr. Caldwell's neighbor, testified he heard a female scream on
October 29 (R-389). He knew Ms. Strong and saw her at Mr. Caldwell's property. He did
not observe the injuries at that time that are displayed in Exhibit 2 (R-395).
Deputy Kelly Bradford of the San Juan County Sheriffs Office testified that he
went to the Super 8 Motel in Monticello, Utah, where Mr. Ray and Ms. Strong had been.
He was there on October 29. Beyond a cement berm outside the motel he found a small
bag which was marked Exhibit 5 (R-397-R-399). It contained a substance he believed to
be methamphetamine. The substance in the Oakley bag was identified as 113.2 grams of
methamphetamine by stipulated entry of the State Crime Lab report, Exhibit 6 (R-414).
Kent Adair, the Monticello Police Chief, testified that on October 29, 1997, he was
present when the bag found by Officer Bradford was opened. There were six baggies
inside (R-411).
8

He testified the motel parking lot was accessible to anyone entering off the street.
The person who left the bag there wouldn't necessarily have to have been checked into
the motel (R-419). Ms. Strong registered at the motel under a false name (R-420). He
testified people do not leave methamphetamine some place where they wouldn't be close
toit(R-421).
After the State rested, the defense called John Roberts. Mr. Roberts was married to
Ms. Strong from March 1984 until 1994. He filed for divorce in 1992, but dropped that
case. He testified she made false allegations in the divorce. Her reputation for credibility
in the community is bad (R-430-R-432). Mr. Roberts also knew Norma Jean had injured
herself in the past. She also had made false allegations that he caused injuries to her that
he had not. The false allegations included tackling and pinning her down (R-434, R-435).
Mr. Roberts was aware of Ms. Strong having made false stories about being
abducted or chased, including one in which the Grand County Attorney supposedly killed
two people (R-336, R-337).
E.

MARSHALLING OF EVIDENCE.

The above Statement of Facts accurately reflects the record in this matter. All
evidence supporting the jury's verdict can be summarized as follows:
1.

Norma Jean Strong, the Defendant's girlfriend for two years before the

dates in the Information, did illegal drugs with him on a regular basis.
2.

Mr. Ray had a habit of hiding his drugs outside of the hotels where he

frequently stayed with Ms. Strong.
3.

Methamphetamine was found outside the motel where the Defendant and

Ms. Strong checked in.
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4.

Ms. Strong testified to an extended period of intimidation and beating over

a lengthy period of time, not just on October 29. Ms. Strong testified about being choked
by the Defendant, hit with a gun, and having had her vehicle driven at her at a high rate
of speed.
5.

Ms. Strong testified she was forced into her own vehicle by Mr. Ray at Blue

Hill and was held against her will for approximately two hours. An independent witness
testified as to seeing a man leap from a vehicle and tackle a person.
6.

Witnesses testified they observed Ms. Strong in a fetal position and

screaming.
7.

Police and medical personnel testified they observed injuries on Ms. Strong

consistent with those she testified about.
Defendant will argue below why the above is legally insufficient to support the
jury's verdict. However, the following points must be noted.
1.

Ms. Strong was a habitual, extensive drug user, was in counseling and had a

fragile emotional state.
2.

Ms. Strong's children had been removed from her by a State agency. Their

return was conditioned upon her termination of her relationship with Mr. Ray.
3.

Despite the above, and despite testimony of her great fear of Mr. Ray,

Ms. Strong continued to see Mr. Ray and testified the only reason she obtained a peace
bond was because Social Services made her.
4.

Ms. Strong had numerous opportunities to leave Mr. Ray's presence and in

fact had done so to phone the police (informing him she was doing so), and returning to
the motel after she picked him up at the side of the road. She did not take advantage of
other opportunities to get away,
5.

She did not see the marble bag or any other drugs in Monticello on the29th

of October.
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6.

The area where the methamphetamine was found was not under the

exclusive control of Defendant. It could have been left there by a person who didn't stay
at the motel.
7.

Ms. Strong and Mr. Ray's relationship had deteriorated to the point where

he was having a sexual relationship with another woman.
8.

Steve Caldwell, one of the "fetal position/screaming" witnesses, stated he

felt Ms. Strong was putting on an act like a little kid throwing a tantrum. He had
witnessed Ms. Strong do weird things and hit herself before to the point he felt it
necessary to restrain her.
9.

Ms. Strong is a thief.

10.

Joe Nelson, the other "fetal position/screaming" witness, did not observe

injuries on Ms. Strong consistent with the Exhibits. Ms. Strong was alone for some time
before being contacted by Officer Guerrero.
11.

John Roberts, Ms. Strong's ex-husband testified as to her bad reputation for

credibility, that she made false allegations including some similar to her complaints in
this case, and that she had injured herself in the past.
12.

Ms. Strong lied when she registered at the motel.

13.

Mr. Ray was not close to the methamphetamine. People do not leave

methamphetamine where they will not be close to it.
14.

There was no testimony that either the amount of methamphetamine or its

packaging indicated an intent to distribute or was for anything more than personal
consumption.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Even considering that all of the marshalled evidence is true, the testimony of
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Ms. Strong is so biased and unbelievable that no reasonable inferences can be drawn
therefrom. There is no evidence whatsoever to support a conclusion of Possession with
Intent to Distribute.
There must be a reasonable doubt as to all three counts.
ARGUMENT

Point I:

The evidence at trial was insufficient to find Mr. Ray guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt on any of the three counts.

Mr. Ray concedes that the burden is on him when challenging the sufficiency of
the verdict to marshall all of the evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion, and
show how, after making all reasonable inferences therefrom, the same is legally
insufficient to support the trial court's conclusion. State v. D.M.Z., 830 P.2d 314, 317
(Utah App. 1992), citing State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990). See also
State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217, 1225. His position is two-fold.
First, the testimony of Ms. Strong is so inherently untrustworthy that no one can
find Mr. Ray guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on kidnapping or aggravated assault based
on it. Second, the same arguments apply to his possession at all of methamphetamine, but
certainly there is no evidence whatsoever to convict him of intent to distribute.
There is no question that methamphetamine was found in the parking lot of a motel
where Mr. Ray had been briefly and recently. Nor is there a dispute that Ms. Strong
suffered some injury, however the biases and motives of Ms. Strong, together with her
inherent unreliability, pervade the trial record and pervert justice.
Ms. Strong's biases are clear. She was at the end of a two-year relationship with
Defendant. He had already begun a sexual relationship with another. She was certainly
angry enough with the Defendant to want revenge against him.
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Her motives are equally transparent. She needed to take decisive action to impress
Social Services. In order to get her children back she had to remove Defendant from her
life. It is clear that despite such incentive she was unable to do so. It was convenient to
have the jury do the same.
She exhibited a willingness to manipulate Social Services in telling them she was
doing what they wanted in getting a restraining order, yet continued to see Mr. Ray
behind their backs. It is certainly easy to assume an equal willingness to manipulate Mr.
Ray's jury.
Her credibility is less than tenuous. She was a habitual, extensive user of
debilitating, illicit drugs. Perhaps because of that, perhaps for other reasons, she was in a
fragile state and testified frequently that she was frequently near collapse. She lied at the
motel when registering. Her bad reputation for credibility in the community was not
rebutted.
Each of the offenses needs to be considered individually, although the credibility
issues discussed should be considered in the whole.
First, Kidnapping. Clearly the parties' relationship should be viewed charitably as
dysfunctional. They engaged in repeated patterns or games of pursuer and pursued. Just
as clearly, Ms. Strong was a participant, not a victim, of this role playing. Her testimony
was clear that she had numerous opportunities over several days to leave Mr. Ray and his
presence. Despite her protestations of fear, she was sufficiently comfortable with Mr. Ray
to tell him she was going to call the police, leave him, and return. Scarcely behavior that
indicates coercion. Her testimony about the events that occurred at Blue Hill have to be
considered not just in the light of her credibility, but also in the context of the totality of
the relationship.
Second, Aggravated Assault. The one disinterested witness at Blue Hill did not
corroborate Ms. Strong's story about an assault with the vehicle. Her injuries that were
witnessed by others could be the result not of the various abuses she testified she suffered
13

from Mr.. Ray, but be self-inflicted. Considering a witness who saw her about the time of
her last contact with Defendant did not observe the injuries consistent with the Exhibits,
and considering her penchant for self-inflicted wounds and false reports, this is likely. Its
probability is bolstered by the testimony of the other witness who saw her around the time
of her last contact with Defendant. He thought she was faking.
Third, Possession with Intent to Distribute. Even given the laxness of constructive
possession standards, it is hard to find any nexus between the Defendant and the
methamphetamine found at the motel. Ms. Strong didn't see any drugs on the day in
question. She had an opportunity and motive to go back and plant the drugs if she did
have some. The drugs were found in an area that Defendant had no exclusive control
over. People don't stray far from their drugs.
As noted above, even if this Court gets past the problems of possession, the record
is totally void of any indication of intent to distribute.
CONCLUSION
The standard for reversal for insufficient evidence is "only when the evidence, so
viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed the crime of which he
[or she] was convicted. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), cited in State v.
Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997). Bracketed material in original. The Defendant
respectfully suggests his case meets exactly those standards and respectfully requests that
his conviction be reversed.
DATED this

j^tA

day of December, 1998.

WILLIAM L. SCH^JJTZ
Attorney for Appellant
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